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Abstract   
As technologies improve, system components are becoming more reliable and are delivering higher performance levels. 
However, most complex systems incorporate humans, and human performance issues are becoming relatively more important.  
In particular, individuals' and groups' cultures are increasingly recognized as major performance-affecting factors.  
In civilian aircraft systems, companies such as Boeing are finding that culture is now the key differentiating factor in aviation 
safety. A similar situation appears to exist across ostensibly similar military air forces.  Accident rates vary greatly across 
cultures, even when comparing near-identical modern aircraft fleets.  
This paper examines the background to cultural issues; it presents a brief description of culture and cultural factors and, as an 
illustrative example, describes the effects of cultural variation on performance in aviation. It examines cultural bias in systems 
engineering standards, and comments on the lack of culture-sensitive systems engineering tools. 
The paper also describes a culture-based modeling tool that has been developed by the authors to evaluate the cultural match of 
individuals and groups to particular environments and, potentially, to complex systems.  It concludes that human error and 
culture are closely linked and that culture must be formally considered in the systems engineering of complex systems. 
Key words - complex systems; cultural factors; power distance; performance; SFMT  
1 Introduction 
As technologies improve and the capabilities of electronic 
and software components increase, performance issues 
associated with the human components of systems become 
limiting factors.  It is increasingly recognized that human 
culture is a factor that needs to be taken into account in 
order to develop a workable, accurate model of a complex 
system that incorporates or interacts with humans, in partic-
ular if those humans are from more than one cultural group. 
Furthermore, non-human components of complex systems 
may have cultural traits built into them by their designers.  
Following ground-breaking work by Hofstede, studies of 
the effects of culture on performance in areas such as 
aviation and medicine have revealed that national cultural 
traits have significant effects on the outcomes of activities, 
including accident rates.  This appears, in part, due to the 
ad-hoc transference of Western systems and procedures, 
with their built-in Western cultural assumptions, to areas of 
the World with significantly different cultures. 
The project researchers believe that there is a significant 
relationship between the cultural traits exhibited by a 
system (comprising human agents, technical agents and 
components) and the performance, reliability and change-
capability of that system in a particular environment. 
2 Culture, its sources and measures 
Humans are genetically adapted to social behavior; the 
culture of the society in which a person is raised is 
assimilated onto that genetic ‘framework’ and reflected in 
that person’s behavior.  So, what is culture? 
Kibr [10] defines culture as: 
“a system of collectively shared values, beliefs, traditions 
and behavioral norms unique to a particular group of 
people, agreed over time” 
Hofstede [6] defines culture as: 
“the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one human group from 
another.  ... includes systems of values; and values are 
among the building blocks of culture”  
The research team prefers Hofstede’s definition, as it 
implies that the acquisition of culture is a largely uncons-
cious process that leaves people with only a limited 
awareness of the influence of that culture on their behavior.   
2.1 Culture and the individual  
It is now generally considered that there are three main 
sources or forms of cultural influence on the individual, 
which overlay the individual’s genetic predisposition to 
social/cultural behavior.  These are: 
• National or ethnic culture, 
• Professional culture, and 
• Organizational culture.   
These are described in more detail below. 
(a) National (or ethnic) culture 
National culture may be different from ethnic culture, in 
particular if there are separate religious or racial groups 
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within a country; however, for the purposes of this paper, it 
will be assumed that national and ethnic culture have the 
same meaning.   
National culture is a product of factors such as heritage, 
religion, history, language, climate, population density, 
availability of resources and politics.  National culture is 
picked up at a formative age, and, once acquired, is difficult 
to change.  National culture affects attitudes and behavior, 
and has a significant affect on interactions with others.  
Some of the areas where significant national differences 
occur are listed below: 
• Leadership styles (hierarchical vs. consultative) 
• Superior – inferior relationships (accepting vs. 
questioning decisions) 
• Communication styles (direct and specific vs. indirect 
and non-specific) 
• Following vs. breaking rules 
• Attitudes to ‘honor’ and the risk of ‘losing face’ 
Helen Klein and Gilbert Kuperman [11] provide an inform-
ative comparison of the national cultures of Westerners and 
Arabs in terms of behavioral expectations, relationships, 
directness, treatment of time, etc. 
(b) Professional culture 
Medical doctors, airline pilots, teachers and many others 
possess particular professional cultures that overlay their 
ethnic or national cultures.  Professional culture is usually 
manifested in its members by a sense of community and by 
the bonds of a common identity [4].  Features associated 
with professional culture can include: 
• Member-specific expertise and a shared professional 
jargon 
• Selectivity, competition and training in order to gain 
entry to the profession 
• Prestige and status with badges or defining uniform 
• Binding norms for behavior and common ethical values  
• Professional and gender stereotyping 
• Institutional and individual resistance to imposed 
change 
• Self-regulation 
• Reduced awareness of personal limitations and  a 
reluctance to admit errors 
Professional culture overlays a person’s national culture.  If 
there are conflicts between the two cultures, in particular in 
threat situations, the earlier-acquired national culture may 
rise to the fore.  Elements of professional culture that are of 
particular importance (e.g. to safety or survivability) need 
to be inculcated by extensive training programs, and 
reinforced at appropriate intervals. 
(c) Organizational culture 
Organizational culture arises out of the history of an 
organization, its leadership, products and services, etc.  
Although there will be a common layer across the 
organization, significant differences will emerge in the case 
of multinationals due to differing national cultures.  These 
will appear as differing leadership styles, manager-subord-
inate relationships, etc. 
There are two layers of organizational culture: 
• Formal, visible, surface structures, e.g. members’ 
uniforms, symbols, documents, routines. 
• Informal, underlying, invisible layer, e.g. values, 
beliefs, subconscious assumptions. 
Organizations have a formal hierarchy of responsibility and 
authority, therefore organizational culture is more amenable 
to carefully-planned change than are either professional or 
national cultures.  Organizational culture channels the 
effects of the other two cultures into standard working 
practices, therefore changes to it that are sympathetic to 
national culture (rather than a culture in the distant group 
head office) can bring significant performance benefits.   
Organizational culture is also unique and that which works 
in one organization is unlikely to work in another.  Some of 
the factors thought to influence or engender organizational 
culture include: 
• Strong corporate identity 
• Effective leadership 
• High morale and trust 
• Cohesive team working and cooperation 
• Job security 
• Development & training 
• Confidence, e.g. in quality and safety practices, 
management communication and feedback 
• High degree of empowerment 
2.2 The development of cultural measures 
In order to deliver significant culture-based improvements 
to the performance of complex systems that incorporate 
humans, it is necessary to model and measure culture.  An 
appropriate set of (preferably quantitative) cultural yard-
sticks is required against which individuals, groups and 
nations can be assessed and compared. 
Over the last fifty or so years, researchers have identified 
many cultural factors (also called dimensions or attributes) 
that appear to capture differences between people from 
different communities.  However, there is as yet no single, 
universally agreed set of cultural factors.  Hofstede [6], [7] 
carried out a major research investigation into culture at 
IBM sites across forty countries between 1967 and 1973.  
Based on the data he collected, he developed a four-
cultural-dimension framework.  Following work by Chinese 
scholars, Hofstede added a fifth dimension that reflected the 
willingness to persevere over long time frames.  Hofstede’s 
cultural framework is currently the most widely recognized; 
the five factors or dimensions are:   
1) Individualism (vs. collectivism) (IDV) 
2) Power distance (PDI) 
3) Masculinity (vs. femininity) (MAS) 
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4) Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) 
5) Long term orientation (LTO) 
Other researchers have produced overlapping but different 
sets of cultural factors, for example Trompenaars & 
Woolliams [15], the GLOBE study [8], Trompenaars [14].  
The GLOBE study was one of the largest recent studies of 
culture; it examined the attitudes and beliefs of more than 
17,000 managers in 62 countries.  The GLOBE Study was 
later extended to complete a more in-depth study of 25 
societies [1].  
Although Hofstede’s first three factors (IDV, PDI & MAS) 
have been validated in a wide range of studies, the other 
factors have elicited less widespread agreement. 
Each cultural factor can be represented by a scale between 
two extremes (e.g. 0 to 100).  For example, power distance 
(PDI) has a scale between very low power distance (e.g. a 
score of 0) and very high power distance (e.g. a score of 
100); individualism has a scale between high individualism 
and high collectivism.  Individuals and groups will score at 
various positions between the extremes. 
A particular cultural factor score may be valuable in 
explaining or predicting behavior in a specific situation; for 
example, high aircrew power-distance scores are closely 
correlated with communication problems and high accident 
rates (see Section 3).  A set of cultural factor scores can 
define an individual or group in cultural terms, and enable 
them to be evaluated against a range of tasks, missions or 
operating environments. 
3 The effects of culture on complex system 
performance 
When engineers design new complex products or systems, 
if they are not consciously aware of cultural factors, their 
design assumptions will be that system users share their 
culture.  These systems will therefore exhibit certain 
cultural traits, or will require certain cultural traits in their 
human components, in order to work optimally.  
Following the publication of Hofstede’s large study of 
managers across IBM’s international operations [6], a 
number of more focused studies have been carried out, in 
particular in the fields of aviation and medicine.  In this 
section, some of the study results in aviation are described, 
and issues associated with culture and its potential inter-
actions with systems engineering are discussed. 
3.1 National cultures and safety across commercial 
aviation 
In its pursuit of improved safety, Boeing has found a 
significant relationship between national cultures and 
accident rates of Western-built commercial passenger jet 
aircraft, even after taking account of differing fleets, ground 
facilities and training.  In particular, Weener’s study of 
aircraft losses between 1952 and 1994 [16] linked national 
scores on several of Hofstede’s cultural factors to increases 
in accidents per million departures. 
During the 1990s, Helmreich & Merritt [4] conducted a 
five-year project that surveyed more than 17,000 airline 
staff from 23 countries, including captains, first officers, 
flight attendants, maintenance staff, managers and trainers. 
Pilots are not typical members of their populations, having 
chosen to compete for a high status cross-cultural occu-
pation requiring specific combinations of skills.  In addition 
they are subject to regular training and retraining regimes, 
including simulator-based flying training and crew resource 
management (CRM).  These training facilities are supplied 
internationally, with minor adaptations.  
Despite the large amount of common training across 
countries, Helmreich & Merritt’s surveys of attitudes 
amongst 8,000 pilots from 22 countries showed close agree-
ment with Hofstede’s original national culture results for 
IBM staff.  In particular, individualism vs. collectivism 
(0.76), power distance (0.77) and uncertainty avoidance 
(0.45) were closely aligned to Hofstede’s results.  However, 
in terms of occupation-related questions, pilots across all 
sampled nations were in closer agreement than would be 
expected purely from the above cultural survey results.  
Nevertheless, in specific areas, there were distinct differ-
ences between cultural groups; examples of these are listed 
below:  
• Asian pilots preferred predictability and order, whereas 
Anglo and North European pilots generally preferred 
flexibility and challenging tasks. 
• Anglo and North European pilots were the most willing 
to make their views known in the cockpit, whereas 
Moroccan, South American and most Asian country 
pilots were the least likely to make their views known; 
this distinction is closely related to power distance (low 
in the case of Anglo pilots, high in the case of most 
Asian pilots).  The unwillingness of crew members to 
draw the captain’s attention to errors or problems has 
been a factor in many commercial aviation accidents. 
• Asian and South American pilots were, in general, 
neutral or agreed that written procedures should be 
provided for all in-flight situations and that rules 
should be obeyed at all times; however, Anglo pilots 
strongly disagreed that written procedures should be 
provided for all in-flight situations and also disagreed 
that rules should be followed when the situation 
suggested otherwise.  
Note that the term ‘Anglo’ covers individuals of British 
descent, including British, US, Canadian, Australian, New 
Zealand, South African and British Hong Kong crew 
members.  
CRM training covers communication skills, team-working, 
situational awareness, problem-solving and decision-
making in order to ensure the optimum use of all resources, 
in particular when working under pressure or operating in 
unusual conditions.  Regular CRM training is now man-
datory for commercial flying crew covered by most of the 
World’s regulatory bodies, and also for an increasing 
proportion of military crew across the World.  However, 
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CRM was pioneered in the USA, and was further developed 
primarily in the USA and Northern Europe.  As a result, 
CRM is based on the assumption of a low power distance 
cockpit, where junior members of the crew are willing to 
query issues with, or challenge, the captain.  Therefore, 
CRM training has been most effective when applied to 
crews of a low power distance culture.  Flight crews from 
high power distance cultures, e.g. South Korea and China, 
have considerable barriers to overcome in order to create 
the cultural environment in which subordinates are willing 
to challenge the captain when they recognize problems or 
errors. 
Jing et al [9] examined accident rate information for airlines 
around the World during the previous twenty years (infor-
mation is available at http://planecrashinfo.com/rates.htm).  
They rearranged the accident rate information by country 
and grouped it into five regions in order to study the 
relationships between national and regional cultures and 
accident rates.   
Jing et al found that the most important cultural variable 
was authoritarianism, which was positively correlated to 
accident rate and appeared to account for over half the 
variance (in accident rates) between cultures.  Their defini-
tion of authoritarianism is very similar to that of power 
distance.  Authoritarianism is very high in mainland China 
and in Taiwan; Chinese subordinates in the cockpit will 
typically agree without query to what the captain demands, 
even if it means deviating from the standard procedures. 
Jing et al state that most commercial aircraft and most 
systems associated with these aircraft are designed by 
Westerners, who have very low levels of authoritarianism. 
Therefore, these Western designers do not understand 
authoritarianism and are unaware of the degree to which 
aircraft operations are vulnerable to distortion by 
authoritarianism. 
European and USA airlines and their pilots now largely 
take for granted their incident reporting programs; the pur-
pose of these programs is to improve safety before acci-
dents occur.  An example of such a program is the 
American Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), impl-
emented at airline companies with the agreement of the 
Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and the pilots’ unions.  
Behind such systems is the assumption that all humans 
make errors, usually unintentionally.  Aircrew should there-
fore be encouraged to report errors and incidents within a 
blame-free environment; changes can then be put in place 
to prevent such errors in the future, or to enable their 
detection and correction before a safety issue arises.   
In contrast to European and USA airline organizations, a 
significant blame and shame culture exists in many Asian 
organizations.  Therefore pilots are much less willing than 
their Western counterparts to reveal any errors on their own 
part if there is a perceived risk of being exposed; this is not 
helped by the belief in Chinese culture that figures of 
authority are error-free.  As an example, Taiwan has had a 
very poor airline flight safety record and, in 1999, the 
Taiwanese government introduced the TACARE voluntary 
incident reporting program in order to improve safety.  In 
2003, Lee & Weitzel [12] carried out a study of Taiwanese 
flight crew members’ acceptance and usage of TACARE, 
as the level of incident reporting was low.  Several issues 
were identified, but the greatest problem appears to have 
been the Chinese punishment culture; carriers would seek to 
identify and punish flight crews responsible for incidents, 
rather than seek to establish and eliminate the root causes of 
incidents.  In this case the greatest barrier appears to be the 
culture of the management rather than that of the flying 
crews.  However, Lee & Weitzel also commented in their 
paper that there was a very high power distance between 
Taiwanese flight crew captains and first officers, a cultural 
factor value known to be strongly, positively correlated 
with flying incidents.  This high power distance would also 
discourage lower ranking officers from reporting incidents 
associated with their captains’ behaviors. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that Western-designed 
training, crew resource management and incident reporting 
systems do not fully meet the needs of non-individualist, 
high power distance cultures.   In addition, aircraft cockpit 
layouts and standard operating procedures are based on 
Western individualist cultural assumptions.   
3.2 National cultures and accident rates in NATO air 
forces 
Detailed research into the effects of cultural factors on 
military aircraft crew performance has revealed very clear 
links between national cultures and accident rates.  A com-
parative study was carried out on fourteen NATO air forces 
by Soeters & Boer [13] using data based on the years 1988 
to 1995.  These air forces used similar or identical aircraft 
and underwent similar training.  They used operating 
procedures and regulations that had been largely harmon-
ized across all NATO countries, and they were also 
involved in the exchange of personnel between NATO air 
forces and in combined exercises with other NATO 
countries.  Nevertheless, strong positive, statistically vali-
dated correlations were found between three national 
cultural factors, listed below, and increased accident rates: 
• High collectivism (or low individualism) 
• High power distance 
• High uncertainty avoidance 
See Subsection 4.1 for descriptions of collectivism and 
power distance. 
The NATO-wide standardization of training, operating 
procedures, exchange of personnel, etc., should clearly have 
produced similar professional cultures and (to a lesser 
extent) similar organizational cultures.  Taking account of 
these common cultural aspects and the significant diff-
erences in accidents rates between countries, it is clear that 
the underlying national cultures exerted a major influence 
on aircrew behavior.  It is important to note that the NATO 
standards, regulations, operating procedures, etc., are based 
on the US/British model; this model has built-in assump-
tions with regard to aircrew cultures, i.e. that they have an 
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Anglo culture (scoring low in collectivism, low in power 
distance and low in uncertainty avoidance). 
3.3 Taking account of culture in systems engineering 
To-date there has been little research into the effects of 
cultural factors on the efficacy of systems engineering.  
There are two major aspects to this issue; the first is 
concerned with the interaction of culture within the actual 
process of systems engineering; the second relates to the 
means of taking account of user/agent culture in the 
proposed product, system or service.  
(a) Cultural biases in the systems engineering process 
Ferris [2] provides a useful analysis of recent systems 
engineering (SE) standards from a cultural perspective; 
because these standards drive the SE processes, their 
cultural biases will be reflected in the SE processes.  The 
standards prior to ISO 15288 were dominated by American 
requirements, e.g. MIL-STD-499A (1974), IEEE 1220 
(1998), EIA 632 (1999).  These prior standards were 
relatively prescriptive in order to ensure consistency.  
However, they enforced a set of costly processes, some of 
which were not always necessary for smaller projects.  
ISO 15288 (2002) has emerged out of the ISO standards 
committee process; it has been subject to a wider range of 
consultation than the previous standards.  Instead of prescr-
ibing how the systems engineering tasks should be carried 
out, it operates at a higher level of abstraction that enables 
systems engineers to produce from it a systems engineering 
practice that suits their own organizations or specific types 
of project.  It requires engineers or managers to make 
decisions about the complexity, size, context, etc., of 
projects in order to produce the most effective systems 
engineering processes for them.  
However, the approach required by ISO 15288 can cause 
problems for certain national cultures:  
• Designing an SE process (in ISO 15288) requires 
decisions about what should be included and what 
should be left out; such decisions involve risk.  For 
risk-averse cultures with high levels of uncertainty 
avoidance, such decision-making, and the lack of a 
prescriptive approach, are problematical. 
• It is likely, due to lack of knowledge and/or time, that 
senior management will have to delegate responsibility 
for the design of a project’s SE process to subordinates.  
This is problematical in high power distance cultures, 
where the senior manager or leader has to be seen to be 
superior in knowledge to his subordinates, and is exp-
ected to tell them not only what tasks to do, but also 
how to do those tasks.  Important decisions are made 
‘at the top’. 
• In high power distance cultures, knowledge is regarded 
as power and is seldom shared with subordinates, so 
those who are best suited to design the SE process may 
not have access to sufficient information. 
Middle-Eastern and Far-Eastern cultures tend to have risk-
averse, high power distance cultures.  Therefore ISO 15288 
will cause difficulties that earlier SE standards did not.  
It may be necessary to generate sets of sector-specific pres-
criptive SE processes from ISO 15288 that can be applied 
in cultures where the above problems arise.  
(b) Cultural biases in the systems-engineered product or 
service 
Culture modifies the ways that users respond to situations 
and, therefore, cultural factors should be taken into account 
when developing system solutions.  Without formal repres-
entations of culture, subconscious design assumptions will 
be built into systems.  
Due to a lack of research to-date on the interactions of 
culture and systems engineering, it is not clear as to the best 
approach.   However, one of the key factors relating to the 
human component of complex systems is the prevention or 
correction of human error; a simple approach based on this 
may provide an initial way forward.  Helmreich & Davies 
[3] classify individual and team errors into five basic types: 
task execution, procedural, communication, decision, inten-
tional non-compliance.  It may be possible to relate cultural 
factors to the likelihood of the above errors (or their sub-
types), and instigate error traps, etc. in systems engineering 
solutions where human interactions and judgments are 
involved.  However, this is at best a partial approach. 
The Soft Factors Modeling Tool (SFMT), described in the 
next section, determines fitness for purpose when matching 
agents (individuals, groups, organizations, software agents) 
to missions or operational environments.   The SFMT is not 
currently intended to be part of an integrated systems 
engineering process, but does enable the exploration of 
cultural factors and their relationships to performance. 
4 The Soft Factors Modeling Tool (SFMT) 
The Soft Factors Modeling Tool (SFMT), now in its second 
major version, is the latest of several prototype culture tools 
developed by Loughborough systems engineering 
researchers.  These tools are part of a research program to 
explore the effects of culture on military operational 
performance, and to develop practical demonstrators of 
culture-based aids for the evaluation and improvement of 
potential mission performance. 
The purpose of the Soft Factors Modeling Tool (SFMT) is 
to enable mission planners to evaluate a set of resources 
(comprising human and technical components) that they 
have brought together to carry out a mission in a particular 
environment.  The SFMT tool could be utilized in order to 
answer a question such as the following example: 
“Is the selected configuration of military assets capable of 
demonstrating appropriate decision-making, communi-
cation and adaptive skills and behavior in an operational 
environment where the command style is control free, 
authority is delegated, operational tempo is unpredictable 
and the battlespace is ill-defined?” 
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The process or method of achieving the above purpose is as 
follows:  
Firstly, the user enters relevant information on the agents’ 
cultures and the operational requirements, by scoring each 
agent in terms of nine cultural factors (see Figure 1), and 
defining the operational environment and the associated 
behavioral/skill requirements by selecting from predefined 
options. 
Secondly, the SFMT compares the ideal cultural factor 
scores for the defined operational environment and for the 
desired behavioral/skill requirements, against the agents’ 
cultural factor scores; it then calculates individual, average 
and overall average mismatch scores; the problem areas are 
then highlighted.  
The operation of the SFMT is described in more detail in 
Subsection 4.2. 
4.1 The current SFMT cultural factors 
As stated earlier, there is no universally-accepted set of 
cultural factors.  An original set of ten factors was chosen 
for the first version of the SFMT after study of both 
academic and military literature.  Following several appli-
cations of the first version of the SFMT, some of these 
factors were found to be difficult to assess or to have little 
effect on assessment outcomes for agents.  As a result, 
several factors were changed and the total number reduced 
to the nine cultural factors used in the current SFMT. 
Of the nine factors selected for the SFMT, five can only be 
exhibited by human agents in a system, and four can be 
exhibited by human (i.e. non-technical) and technical (i.e. 
software) agents within a system, as shown in Figure 1.   
Proactive Orthodox
Individualism Collectivism
Universalism Particularism
Time synchronization Time sequencing
Power-by-achievement Power-by-status
Low power distance High power distance
Low risk taking High risk taking
Masculinity Femininity
Attributable to 
human (non-
technical) 
agents
Attributable to 
both human 
(non-technical) 
and technical 
agents
Mastery Fatalism
 
Figure 1:  Nine soft factors (cultural factors) 
An agent exhibiting behavior to the extreme left in Figure 1 
(e.g. very high individualism) will score -5 on the SFMT 
culture factor value scale, behavior to the extreme right 
(e.g. very high collectivism) will score +5.  Users of the 
SFMT are provided with descriptions of the extremes for 
each cultural factor in terms of the typical attitudes, beliefs, 
perceptions, etc.  
It is important to note that the factor scores are not intended 
to imply good or bad, right or wrong, but to indicate a 
greater or lesser appropriateness to a particular mission or 
operational environment. 
Cultural factors can relate to a single system (e.g. an 
individual or missile launcher), a group of sub-systems (e.g. 
a troop or a communications infrastructure) or an overall 
system (e.g. the army or the full set of assets carrying out a 
mission).  Typically an SFMT exercise will consider agents 
or systems at more than one level, e.g. a particular 
individual, a group and a supporting organization. 
There is insufficient space to provide detailed descriptions 
of all the cultural factors used in the SFMT, but two trunc-
ated examples are presented below.  Details of other cult-
ural factors are provided in Hodgson & Siemieniuch [5].  
•    Individualism vs. collectivism:  This refers to the 
balance struck between individuals and groups.  In 
individualistic societies, ties between individuals (other 
than immediate family members) tend to be loose; an 
individualist takes responsibility for his or her actions; 
individualists tend to speak directly and factually, and 
are willing to argue and to question others’ views.  
Generally, individualists tend to exhibit a higher level 
of trust of others than do collectivists.  In collectivistic 
societies, individuals are integrated into closely knit 
groups, often in the form of extended families; in return 
for unquestioning loyalty, they gain the protection of 
their group.  People from outside the group tend to be 
treated with suspicion.  Collectivists try to avoid direct, 
confrontational approaches and find criticizing others 
difficult.  Hierarchies tend to be rigid, and losing face 
is to be avoided at all costs. 
• Low power distance vs. high power distance is about 
the relationships between subordinates and superiors.  
In low power distance organizations, decision struc-
tures tend to be decentralized, with a low concentration 
of authority.  Decisions are more likely to be made by 
agents with appropriate knowledge and experience, 
irrespective of roles; inequality of agent roles is a 
matter of tradition and convenience and can change 
within an operational environment.  Superior officers/-
agents rely on experience and on lower ranking 
personnel/agents, and lower ranks/agents expect to be 
consulted.  Decisions can be questioned and overridden 
in particular circumstances.  In high power distance 
organizations, there are centralized decision structures 
and a high concentration of authority.  Decisions are 
made by agents in authority based on their roles in the 
organization, and are dispatched downwards through 
the organization; the inequality of agent roles reflects 
reality.  Superior officers/agents rely on CONOPS, 
procedures, etc., and lower ranks/agents expect to be 
told - decisions are rarely questioned and never over-
ridden in any circumstances.  Privileges and status 
symbols for higher ranks/agents are expected. 
4.2 The methodology of the SFMT 
The SFMT requires the user to describe the various agents 
to be deployed on a mission, then to describe the mission. 
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Up to three different agents can be entered (e.g. platoon 
members, platoon leader and command & control (C2)).  
Following entry of the nine culture factor scores for each of 
up to three agents, the user must generate a description of a 
proposed mission.  In order to do this, the SFMT provides 
input tables based on an environment master and a behavior 
master (see below), which enable the planner to describe a 
proposed mission in terms of the operating environment and 
required behaviors simply by selecting predefined ‘charac-
teristics’.  Note that, as well as entering the actual cultural 
factor scores, the user can also enter what he or she con-
siders to be the desirable culture factor scores. 
Sets of predefined environment and behavior characteristics 
are stored in the SFMT.  Each characteristic is associated 
with ideal values (or scores) for each of the nine cultural 
factors; together, these form the environment master and 
behavior master.  As an example, an operational environ-
ment with a strong centralized structure might have an ideal 
individualism/collectivism score of ‘+2’ (i.e. an agent on 
the collectivistic side), whereas an operational environment 
with the opposite, i.e. a decentralized structure, might have 
an ideal individualism score of ‘-3’ (i.e. an agent on the 
individualistic side). 
Following entry of the culture values and selection of the 
environment characteristics and desirable behavior charac-
teristics, feedback is presented to the user(s) to highlight 
potential mismatches between the agents’ cultural factor 
values and the optimum values for the mission environment 
and the associated desirable behaviors.  A simplified repres-
entation of the SFMT process is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2:  Simplified flow diagram for SFMT 
Sample summary results for environmental mismatch are 
presented in Figure 3.  The SFMT employs a ‘traffic light’ 
system – green for close match, amber for moderate mis-
match and red for significant mismatch.  As can be seen 
from our example in Figure 3, there appear to be moderate 
mismatches between as-is (or actual) culture factor values 
of the troop members and Brigade HQ and those required 
for the environmental aspects of the mission. 
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Centralised structure 0.5 1.3 0.6 1.0 1.2 0.9
Decentralised structure 2.8 0.3 2.4 1.3 0.8 1.5
Authoritative/interventionist 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.1 1.2 0.8
Collaborative/control free 2.7 0.4 2.2 1.1 0.8 1.4
Formal communication structure 0.4 1.4 0.0 1.1 1.2 0.8
Informal communication structure 2.3 0.5 1.9 0.7 0.5 1.4
Strong directive leadership 1.1 2.2 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.0
Consensus based leadership 1.2 0.7 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.8
Stovepiped function distribution 0.2 1.4 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.1
Dispersed function distribution 3.2 0.4 2.0 0.7 0.4 0.4
Centralised authority over actions 0.6 1.8 0.3 1.4 1.5 1.3
Delegated authority over actions 2.3 0.6 1.5 0.8 0.7 1.1
Largely heterogenous systems 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Largely homogeneous systems 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Largely heterogenous SOPs 1.3 0.5 2.7 0.5 0.4 0.4
Largely homogeneous SOPs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Clear role and task definition 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7
Fuzzy role and task definition 2.5 0.6 2.6 1.0 0.6 1.3
Tightly defined rules of engagement 1.7 2.4 1.0 2.3 2.1 3.0
Broader rules of engagement 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Small well defined battlespace 1.8 2.8 0.8 2.8 2.5 3.3
Large unbounded battlespace 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Predictable 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.2
Unpredictable 2.1 0.9 1.6 0.9 0.9 1.1
Reasonably static 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rapid changes 2.6 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2
Less than adequate 1.7 0.6 1.9 0.7 0.6 1.4
Adequate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Long horizon 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
Short horizon 2.2 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.6 1.1
Ad-hoc 1.8 0.9 1.9 0.9 1.0 1.1
Preconceived 0.6 1.2 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.8
Offensive warfare 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.5
OOTW - peacemaking 2.1 1.1 2.5 0.9 0.9 1.3
OOTW - peacekeeping 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.3 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.7
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Figure 3:  Example results summary for environment 
Sample summary results for behavioral mismatch are 
presented in Figure 4.  From this figure, it appears that there 
is a significant mismatch between the as-is culture values 
for the Brigade HQ and those required for the behavioral 
aspects of the mission. 
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Say what you mean, mean what you say 1.6 0.4 1.9 1.3 1.0 1.1
Convey meaning indirectly/diplomatically 0.8 3.6 0.8 0.7 2.2 0.8
Handle/dispel conflict 3.7 1.7 1.5 0.3 0.7 0.1
Ability to trust and be trusted 3.3 1.4 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.1
Willingness to collaborate/co-operate 3.5 2.1 2.1 0.7 0.7 1.5
Transparency/openness 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Process information rapidly 2.0 0.0 4.8 3.0 0.2 0.8
Deal with ambiguity, contradictions & 1.6 0.6 3.5 0.7 1.2 0.8
Deal with complexity 0.9 1.5 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2
Deal with incomplete information 2.5 0.5 5.0 1.8 0.9 0.9
Objective analysis of technical data 0.4 1.3 0.3 0.5 1.2 1.1
Prioritise information 1.5 3.6 0.3 1.8 2.8 2.4
Sharing information 4.0 1.2 3.8 1.2 0.6 2.0
Ability to deal with risk 2.2 0.5 2.9 1.3 0.8 1.3
Deal with variable time pressures 0.8 0.4 2.0 0.4 0.4 0.0
Willingness to take decisions 1.2 0.8 3.8 0.5 0.8 2.3
Will follow orders and CONOPS 2.2 3.1 1.8 2.9 2.6 2.8
Act autonomously 1.3 0.4 1.8 0.8 0.9 1.0
Recognises mistakes/takes action 2.4 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.4 0.8
Ability to motivate others 2.3 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.0
Ability to delegate 0.0 0.5 4.3 0.0 0.5 2.0
Ability to direct others 0.5 2.1 0.3 1.0 2.1 0.5
Sets the standards for performance 1.8 0.5 2.5 1.3 1.4 1.0
Willingness to take risks 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.5
Ability to balance risk 1.8 2.3 3.2 0.8 0.7 0.5
Can self-organise, reconfigure 4.0 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.3
Capable of learning from action/result 2.8 1.6 4.0 0.6 0.5 0.7
Physical orientation from external cues 2.5 3.5 0.2 2.0 2.5 0.6
Cognitive orientation from external cues 1.3 1.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.0
Social orientation from external cues 0.8 2.0 0.3 0.6 1.2 0.2
Robustness 3.2 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
Resilience 2.0 0.8 1.4 0.0 0.8 0.4
Responsiveness 2.6 0.3 2.3 0.3 0.3 0.5
Flexibility 2.6 0.3 3.0 0.3 0.3 0.6
Adaptability 3.2 0.4 1.9 0.4 0.4 0.4
Cognitive preparedness 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.2
Flexibility in action 3.4 1.2 4.2 1.0 0.6 1.8
Analytical thinking 1.6 2.1 2.0 1.4 1.9 2.6
Holistic thinking 0.3 2.5 2.0 0.5 2.5 1.0
Concrete reasoning 2.0 2.0 1.5 3.3 2.0 2.0
Hypothetical reasoning 0.0 0.1 2.3 0.0 0.5 0.4
3.0 1.7 3.6 1.5 1.4 1.7
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Figure 4:  Example results summary for behavior 
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4.3 Applications of the SFMT to-date 
The SFMT is intended for use as a forward-looking 
planning aid, to enable mission planners to make good use 
of their human and technical resources.  However, most 
applications to-date have been carried out to evaluate the 
SFMT.  Therefore, the SFMT has been applied primarily to 
historical military actions that have met appropriate criteria, 
in particular: 
• Detailed information was available about: 
o Mission details (objectives, rules of engagement, 
resources, etc.) 
o Types and cultural backgrounds of agents 
o Problems and outcomes 
• Culture was considered to have played a significant 
part in the outcomes 
The actions (or scenarios) that have been evaluated include: 
• Elements of the British Army in the Bosnian War 
• The USS Vincennes incident 
• The UK actions in Sierra Leone 
• The British Army in Afghanistan 
In each of the above cases a large amount of literature was 
available.  This included official military reports, unofficial 
reports and books written by personnel involved in or close 
to the actions, and articles written by investigative 
journalists.  
The above military applications have demonstrated the 
general validity of the SFMT model.  There have been no 
inexplicable results and the levels and areas of warning 
emerging from the SFMT have been in general alignment 
with known outcomes (positive or negative). 
In order to evaluate the potential for wider application (i.e. 
use other than on military missions), the SFMT was applied 
by a person not familiar with the tool to a small UK design 
and manufacturing company.  The results highlighted issues 
that were known to be present in the company, but it was 
clear that some of the SFMT terminology would require 
changes and that the ‘environment master sheet’, in 
particular would require modification.  
The SFMT is now at the stage where it would benefit from 
application by relevant military subject matter experts 
(SMEs). 
4.4 Current limitations of the SFMT 
The current version of the SFMT has been designed to be 
freestanding and simple to use in order to evaluate some 
basic hypotheses about culture and performance in military 
scenarios.  However, the SFMT has several limitations, due 
in part to time and resource constraints; these are listed 
below:  
Evaluating a team:  At present, the SFMT deals with each 
of up to three agents individually, and highlights each of 
those agents’ ‘mismatches’.  In reality, most missions 
require several (or many) agents and these agents, taken 
together, could be chosen to match the requirements of the 
environment or mission.  Ideally we would need to 
distinguish between mismatches that are positively 
dangerous (such that the agent should not be included on 
this mission) and those that simply represent a lack of 
capability that could be met by including other agents with 
the missing capability on the mission. 
Culture as one of several factors:  In many cases, 
resource limitations, training and other factors also play a 
major role in the outcomes of missions, and these factors 
need to be included alongside cultural factors when 
carrying out an evaluation of mission resources.  
Number of cultural factors used by the SFMT:  A large 
body of culture-related knowledge has emerged over the 
last fifty years, but no definitive set of cultural factors has 
emerged as a ‘clear winner’; there are perhaps three-to-five 
outstanding candidate cultural factors.  Recent culture 
research (for example the Globe studies [3], [11]) has not 
improved this situation.  In part due to this ‘lack of clarity’, 
the SFMT uses more cultural factors (9) than are ideal 
(perhaps 4 or 5). 
Environmental and behavioral characteristics:  Further 
work is needed in order to identify the optimum sets of 
behavioral and environmental characteristics (these are 
captured in the SFMT’s environment master and behavior 
master).  It would also be valuable to determine whether 
these characteristics could be applied to all military situa-
tions, to political situations and/or to business applications.  
5 Conclusions 
As the performance of complex systems improves in terms 
of functionality and reliability, the performance of the 
human agent in the system is coming under increasing 
scrutiny.   
Human error is now the major cause of failure in complex 
systems, and certain cultural traits (e.g. high power 
distance) are associated with increased accident and failure 
rates.  In the case of jet transport aircraft and military 
aircraft, the effects of differing cultural traits are exacer-
bated by the unintended cultural biases that are built into 
Western aircraft, operating procedures, training and monit-
oring systems that are exported to non-Western cultures.  
The above biases exist in part because systems engineering 
standards and processes do not formally acknowledge 
differing human cultures and their effects on performance.  
Cultural biases exist at two levels in systems engineering.  
Firstly, they exist at the meta-level, i.e. in the definition of 
the processes and standards of systems engineering (e.g. 
ISO 15288), reducing the capabilities of users of certain 
cultural backgrounds to apply them.  Secondly, systems 
engineering tools do not include guidance or means of 
incorporating cultural factors, where relevant.  Without 
formalized means of incorporating cultural constraints into 
the design of complex systems, subconscious design 
assumptions about culture are instead incorporated.  
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Although culture and its effects on performance have been 
the subject of much research over the last fifty years, no 
complete, clear, comprehensive set of cultural factors has 
emerged that meets all requirements.  As a result, resear-
chers have to pick and choose those that appear to be the 
‘best fit’. 
The Loughborough researchers have developed a culture 
modeling tool (the Soft Factors Modeling Tool, SFMT) to 
evaluate human and other agents against operational envir-
onment requirements on the basis of their cultural factor 
values.  An improved understanding of the impact that 
various configurations of cultural factors can have on the 
potential performance of agents in specified operational 
environments has emerged from the application of the 
SFMT to several scenarios.  However, more field research 
is required in order to identify the optimum set of cultural, 
behavioral and environmental factors that would form the 
basis of a practical, effective culture toolset.  
Although the SFMT is not intended to be a systems engine-
ering tool, the associations it utilizes between cultural factor 
values and performance capabilities in specified operational 
environments could form the basis for an extension to a 
systems engineering toolset. 
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